Induction from one example and statistics:
Analogy as a minimization principle

Antoine CORNUÉJOLS
Equipe Intérence et Apprentissage
Laboratoire de Recherche en Informatique (LRI), UA 410 du CNRS
Université de Paris-sud, Orsay
Bâtiment 450, 91405 ORSAY (France)
email (UUCP) : antoine@iri.fr

Abstract

If analogy is indeed a form of induction, it is a very special one in that (i) it works from the specific to the specific apparently without relying on vast numbers of observations, and (ii) it does not necessarily involve general rules that would apply both to the 'source' of the analogy and to its 'target'. It thus appears quite remote from the realms of statistics.

A survey of the current computational approaches to analogy shows that they all embrace the "analogy as a matching process" perspective differing only on constraining factors and search mechanisms. An appropriate analogy is accordingly one that makes a good match between the descriptions of the analogues allowing to induce new properties for the ill-known target. These matching-based theories gives ways to some dissatisfaction however. Mainly, (i) deep reasons, other than intuitive ones, for considering analogy as a matching process lack, (ii) the proposed mechanisms are very dependent on the knowledge representation, (iii) they do not explain well some properties of analogy viz. non symmetry and non idempotence of analogy, or the propensity to learn making good analogies, and (iv) these mechanisms exploit but do not explain why analogy preferably transfer abstract concepts rather than more literal ones.

This paper proposes a new point of view on analogy that offers possible answers to these queries. Analogy is seen as a realization of an economy principle that minimizes the complexity of the transformation from the source to the target as measured by description length. These description lengths in turn are dependent upon statistical properties of the concepts and abstractions used to account for the analogy. This is where learning can take place so as to facilitate further analogies in the same domain. Tests on a classical domain task confirm that the application of this principle correctly predicts the best analogies.

Keywords: analogy, cognitive modeling, minimum description length.
1. Introduction: analogy, induction and computational models

1.1. Analogy: a special form of induction

Peculiarities of analogy that make it different from other, traditionally considered as more typical forms of induction, are that (i) it works from the specific to the specific apparently without relying on vast numbers of observations, and (ii) it does not necessarily involve general rules that would apply both to the ‘source’ of the analogy and to its ‘target’. Models of analogy must therefore propose mechanisms allowing for specific to specific inferencing and this possibly between different domains. Analogy thus appears quite remote from the realms of statistics.

1.2. Current models of analogical thought

A survey of existing computational studies shows that for solving the specific to specific inference problem, the hypothesis of analogy as a mapping process between the representations of the analogues has been unanimously adopted following Winston (1980). Recognizing then that a combinatorial number of possible mappings between graph-representations exists, the problem have become one of taming this complexity to allow focussing on relevant and most promising ones. To this effect, a number of intuitively appealing hypotheses have been made, that we have no place to describe here (see [Burstein,86],[Clement & Gentner,91],[Falkenheimer,87],[Gentner,83],[Gick & Holyoak,80 & 83],[Holyoak & Thagard,89],[Kedar-Cabelli,85]). However these models still leave place for dissatisfaction.

First, there is no formal ground for choosing the analogy as mapping paradigm. Second, all models mentioned so far are highly dependent on the a priori designed representation scheme (see [Keane,88], [Chalmers et.al,92] for criticisms and illustrations). The latter is a serious drawback, even more so that at the same time it seems quite undisputable that analogy is not only mapping between representations but also and foremost the making of these representations appropriate for a given context through perception. Finally, it has not been proved that existing models can account for the properties of analogy. It seems that a well-founded theory of analogy must explain these properties.

1.3. Properties of analogy

We list here six properties of analogy that we feel are telltale symptoms and accordingly important test beds for any would-be theory of analogy.

1. Analogy is pervasive in cognition.

2. Abstract analogies are generally preferred over more literal ones.

3. There is generally a good agreement in the ratings of analogies among different people.

4. Analogy is non involutive (fof ≠ Id). In other words analogy is non symmetric. One can readily find examples where transferring properties from the source to a target and
then back from the initial target to the initial source, brings discrepancies between the initial properties of the source and the transferred back ones.

5. Analogy is non idempotent (so \( f \circ f \neq f \)). If \( A \) is used to infer analogically properties about \( B \), and then \( B \) is used to augment the knowledge about \( C \), the result may differ from the one obtained by directly using \( A \) analogically on \( C \). It must be noticed here that properties 4 and 5 call into question the feasibility of Case Based Reasoning where the case library is supposed to grow incrementally with the system’s history. Indeed it follows from 4 and 5 that inconsistent case bases might be created.

6. Analogy making can be improved with practice. At least some domain-dependent forms of analogical reasoning can be learned.

This is in part while trying to account for these properties that the point of view on analogy reported in this paper has gradually emerged. The overall spirit of this view is presented in the next section. Then, in section 3, its formal foundations are reviewed and explained. Section 4 illustrates the application of this approach to examples drawn from a classical analogy domain. Finally, the conclusion section sums up the current findings and underlines the deep relationships between inferencing and statistics.

2. Analogy as an economy principle

We limit ourselves here to one component of analogical reasoning: the transfer of some properties of the source to the target, ignoring the problem of conjuring up in mind a good analogue as well as the difficulties related to the validation and tuning of the result in the target domain. We will assume for the time being that one can legitimately isolate such components.

Analogy making is, in part, perceiving some aspects of the structures of two situations—the essences of those situations, in some sense—as identical. In a way, one might consider the essences of the analogues as the necessary information that, when provided, allows one to easily transform part of one situation into part of the other, these parts being the relevant ones in the context of analogy. But how to bring these essential aspects out?

Suppose we try to transform, by way of symbolic manipulations, one analogue, the source, into the other, the target. We know that if we find an economic transformation means, there are reasons to believe that we hit on an appropriate information supply, that is some essential commonalities between the analogues.

In classical schema where \((A_1 \rightarrow B_1)\) is the source and \(A_2\) is the target problem with \(B_2\) being the unknown, analogy making is trying to find ways of representing \(A_1, B_1,\) and \(A_2\) so that (i) an economic transformation \(\alpha\) using these representations exist between \(A_1\) and \(A_2,\) and (ii) \(\beta\) the relevant dependency \(A_1 \rightarrow B_1\) be represented.

This is in a way reminiscent to the physical problem of finding the minimal surface given some contour. Here we try to find the concepts or abstractions that will allow the most economical way of transforming \(A_1\) to \(A_2\) and \(A_1\) to \(B_1\).
Figure 1: Analogy is seen as minimizing a "surface" given the contour \((A_1 \rightarrow B_1)\) and \((A_1 \rightarrow A_2)\). This surface is then used as a basis for constructing \(B_2\).

3. The Minimization Description Length Principle

3.1. Origins

In its naive version, induction consists in drawing general rules from specific observations. These general rules or hypotheses are subject to three constraints: (i) to be more general than the original observations, otherwise they have little value; (ii) to be testable so that later observations may falsify them; and (iii) to inspire confidence, that is to be most probable given the observations.

A general principle that dates back at least to William of Ockham (1290?-1349?) seems to satisfy these three criteria to the best. This is the Principle of Simplicity which asserts that the 'simplest' hypothesis or explanation is the most reliable1. During the last thirty years, 'simplicity' has been equated with 'shortest effective description', so that if there are alternative explanations for a given body of observations, one should select the one with the shortest description. In the first formalization ([Solomonoff,64], [Kolmogorov,65], [Chaitin,87]) called algorithmic or Kolmogorov complexity, hypotheses were considered as the effective computable procedures able to generate as output the observations. The best hypothesis was thus the shortest procedure as measured with the Turing machine encoding scheme that is the one that allowed maximum compressibility of the data.

As has been noted in the introduction, analogy is a special form of induction in which the data consist in a single compound object: the source and its target. It is therefore a great advantage for our purpose, and one that distinguishes it from statistical approaches, that algorithmic complexity applies equally well to sets of observations and to single objects. However, compressibility through Turing machines is not a method that is to be used lightheartedly in Artificial Intelligence. Indeed, one usually looks for explanations expressed within some model classes, and not explanations expressed as abstruse bit

---

1 In spite of its appealing and intuitive reasonableness, justifying this Principle is an involved and delicate problem. [Pearl,78] is recommended readings as well as the founding papers of [Solomonoff,64] and [Kolmogorov,65]. More recently, the excellent textbook of [Li & Vitaniy,93] offers a thorough treatment of algorithmic complexity.
strings. This is where the Minimum Description Length Principle ([Rissanen,89], [Wallace & Boulton,68]) intervenes.

3.2. The Minimum Description Length Principle (MDLP)

Rissanen starts from the observation that scientific theories often involve two steps. First the formulation of a set of possible alternative hypotheses (for which he does not offer any mechanism), and, second, the selection of one hypothesis as the most likely one. Rissanen proposes that this selection mechanism obeys the Minimum Description Length Principle which states that:

The best theory to explain a set of data is the one which minimizes the sum of

- the length, in bits, of the description of the theory; and,
- the length, in bits, of data when encoded with the help of the theory.

There is a deep relationship between the MDLP and the Bayesian approach. Indeed, one can derive the former from the latter by observing that from Bayes' Rule:

\[ P(H|D) = \frac{P(D|H)P(H)}{P(D)} \]

where \( H \) is an hypothesis, and \( D \) is the set of observed data, and where we are looking for the hypothesis \( H \) that maximizes \( P(H|D) \) it follows:

\[-\log P(H|D) = -\log P(D|H) - \log P(H) + \log P(D)\]

Minimizing this expression is then equivalent to minimizing \(-\log P(D|H) - \log P(H)\) since the length of \( D \) is fixed for any \( H \). This yields the MDLP.

3.3. Practical problems: encoding scheme and intractability

The problems when trying to apply the MDLP are twofold. First, the length of an explanation will depend on the languages or codes used for describing both the theory and the data. Second, Kolmogorov has proved that searching for the shortest description of an object is NP-complete.

The first problem is known as the encoding problem. An answer to it is that, following the equivalence just mentioned between the MDLP and Bayes' Rule, the code used should reflect, when possible, our prior expectations about the environment: that is descriptions of common or important concepts should be shorter than descriptions of unusual or unimportant ones. We will therefore require that the coding schemes be efficient, i.e. that they provide optimal encodings of the theories with respect to their a priori probability of occurrence, and of the data with respect to each theory. This means that what constitutes a good theory will always be dependent on our expectations about the world. If this seems disappointing, it is exactly these expectations that make the induction problem tractable.

To the second problem, the absence of any effective way of calculating the best theory, there is no other answer than be content with searching for satisfying theories only.
4. Analogy and M.D.L.P.

4.1. Overview of the task domain and the experiments

As a task domain, we have chosen the microworld developed by Hofstadter et al. for the COPYCAT project (Mitchell,93). In this domain, the analogy problems consists in finding how a letter string is transformed given, as an example, another string and its transform. For instance, given that \( \text{abc -> abd} \), what becomes of \( \text{iijjll -> ?} \)?

This microworld offers several useful features. It is simple in its definition and it is reasonably straightforward to find adequate knowledge representation primitives for it. It nonetheless provides much of the richness of the analogy problem. And, finally, it is easy to rate the relative merits of the possible solutions for the test riddles.

As a first step towards a complete account of analogy as a Minimum Description Length problem, a preliminary check for the feasibility of the project is to build an encoding scheme for the abstractions, rules and concepts than can enter analogy making, and then see if the ensuing description lengths of possible solutions for given test problems reflect the expectations about their quality. For instance, it is expected that, to the aforementioned problem, \( \text{iijjmm} \) is a better solution than \( \text{iijjl} \). Is the description length associated with the first solution accordingly shorter than the description length for the second one?

4.2. Proposal for an encoding scheme

In an analogy problem, we can consider that the data are the descriptions of the source and the target, and the theories are the conceptual constructions that allows to express the transformation of the source into the target and the relevant properties of the source that need to be transferred (see figure 2 in section 4.3). We now have to describe the primitives that allow to represent both the data and the theories. At the same time we have to assign them a coding length that obeys as much as possible the efficiency criteria underlined in section 3.3.

The knowledge representation primitives are mostly the ones used in [Mitchell,93]. They include: the 26 letters of the alphabet, numbers, concepts of relative positions such as leftmost, rightmost and middle, types of objects called unit-base such as letters and groups of letters, directions for reading the strings: left and right, primitives for successor laws like \( \text{succ}(i,x) \) meaning taking the \( i \)th successor of unit-base \( x \), and \( \text{pred}(i,x) \) for the corresponding \( i \)th predecessor of unit-base \( x \).

Using these primitives, we define templates for the descriptions of the letter strings (the data) and for the descriptions of the transformations between letter strings (the theories).

1. Description of the letter strings.

The letter strings (e.g. \( \text{abc} \) or \( \text{iijjkk} \)) can be described using a template formulated as a grammar. For each string we may specify the following characteristics: a read-direction, the unit-base, the successor-law, the length, and the starting unit-base. Each of these 'attributes' can possibly be itself described recursively using other attributes. For instance,
iijjkk = a read-direction (right)
unit-base (group of same unit-base (letters) of length (2))
successor-law (letter → succ(1, letter))
of length (3)
starting-with (unit-base of (letters = 'I'))

This description corresponds to the perception of the string ii jj kk as the grouping of three successive groups of 2 identical letters. Of course, other perceptions are possible, as for instance a very literal and myopic one:

ii jj kk = 'i''i''j''j''k''k' from left to right

2. Description of the transformations.

A transformation between letter strings or concepts or abstractions must specify what has to be changed in the description so as to obtain the transformed object from the original one. This corresponds to the conditional information needed, in addition to the information contained in the original object, to get the new one. The best induction is obtained when this conditional information is maximally compressed. Here the application of the MDLP results in the choice of certain abstractions and constructions thereof.

For instance, following the works of Hofstadter et al., we will restrain the description of the dependence relation $\beta$ to the mold "Replace _ by _" where the _ can stand for diverse concepts of various levels of abstraction e.g. letter, unit-base (...), 'A', succ(i,x).

\[ a \quad b \quad c \quad \alpha \quad A \rightarrow I \quad \beta_1 \]
\[ \text{Replace right-most letter by successor} \]

\[ \alpha' \quad \{ \text{Idem} \} \quad \beta_2 = \beta_1 \]

\[ a \quad b \quad d \quad i \quad j \quad l \]

**Figure 2**: A simple example of the description of an analogy.
The resemblance relation α on the other hand will state the correspondence for each modified attribute of a description. For instance, between the descriptions of abc and ijk, the α relation may be stated as:

\[ \alpha = \text{starting-with (unit-base} \rightarrow 'A') \rightarrow \text{starting-with (unit-base} \rightarrow 'I') \]

It could as well be stated as:

\[ 'A' \rightarrow 'I' ; 'B' \rightarrow 'J' ; 'C' \rightarrow 'K' \]

Figure 2 gives an example of an analogy using these description schemes.

3. The encoding scheme: yardsticks for description lengths

In the absence of prior probabilities on the various concepts and compound descriptions, it is natural to resort to measures of the relative specificity of the concepts: the more general ones being simpler to specify than less general ones need correspondingly shorter descriptions. It is customary to organize concepts in hierarchies. In the letter microworld for instance, 'group of letters' is more general than 'group of 1 letter', which is itself more general than, say, the letter 'A'. We get therefore the following hierarchies:

Each node of these hierarchies is assigned a probability within this hierarchy according to its specificity. Now, following well-known rules for efficient encoding, the optimal coding length for a concept of probability \( P \) should be \(-\log(P)\). This is what will be taken here. For instance the description length of 'succ(3,_)' is then : \(-\log(1/16) = 4 \) bits.

The description length of compound abstractions will be taken as the sum of the description lengths of their components. Hence:

\[ L(\text{letter} \rightarrow \text{succ(2, letter)}) = -2 \log P(\text{group of 1 letter}) - \log P(\text{succ(2,_)}) \]

\[ = 1 + 3 = 4 \text{ bits} \]
4.3. Analogy as an economical perception of the source and target

Looking at an analogy problem, we can consider that the data are the descriptions of \( A_1 \), \( A_2 \) and \( B_1 \), and the theories are the constructions that allows to transform \( A_1 \) into \( A_2 \) (via \( \alpha \)) and to transform \( A_1 \) to \( B_1 \) (via \( \beta_1 \)). Now what makes \( \alpha \) and \( \beta_1 \) interdependent is that they are built using as many common parts or abstractions as possible. This allows the economical description of the analogy. Because there does not always exist a common generalization of the analogues (they might belong to different domains), it might be necessary to introduce different sets of abstractions, \( \text{Abs}_1 \) and \( \text{Abs}_2 \).

\[
\begin{array}{c}
A_1 \\
\alpha \\
\beta_1 \\
B_1 \\
\end{array}
\begin{array}{c}
\text{Abs}_1 \\
\alpha' \\
\text{Abs}_2 \\
\beta_2 \\
? \\
\end{array}
\begin{array}{c}
A_2 \\
\end{array}
\]

Figure 3: Abstractions are used to make up the descriptions of the transformations \( \alpha \) and \( \beta \). The best abstractions are the ones that allow short descriptions for both \( \alpha \) and \( \beta_1 \). Once the abstractions \( \text{Abs}_1 \) and \( \text{Abs}_2 \) are found, obtaining \( \beta_2 \) is simply obtained by translating \( \beta_1 \) using \( \alpha' \).

We propose the following formalization of the MDLP when applied to analogy. \( \text{Abs}_1 \) is considered as the theory, and we look for efficient ways of encoding in this theory \( \text{Abs}_2 \), \( \alpha \) and \( \beta_1 \). The overall complexity of the analogy is then measured using the formula:

\[
L(\text{analogy}) = L(\text{Abs}_1) + L(\beta_1 | \text{Abs}_1) + L(\alpha') + L(\alpha | \alpha')
\]

It must be noted that \( \alpha' = I(\text{Abs}_1 | \text{Abs}_2) \), the information required to generate \( \text{Abs}_2 \), when knowing \( \text{Abs}_1 \) and that \( \alpha \) and \( \beta_1 \) are similarly defined.

We illustrate this with the following example: \( \text{abc} \Rightarrow \text{abd} ; \text{ijjkk} \Rightarrow ? \)

\( A_1 \) = a read-direction(right)
- unit-base(letter)
- successor-law(letter \( \rightarrow \) succ(1, letter))
- of length(3)
- starting-with(letter = 'A')

\( A_2 \) = a read-direction(right)
- unit-base(group of same letters of length(3))
- successor-law(letter \( \rightarrow \) succ(1, letter))
- of length(3)
- starting-with(letter = 'I')

\( \text{Abs}_1 \) = a read-direction(right); unit-base(letter);
- successor-law(letter \( \rightarrow \) succ(1, letter)); of length(3)
Abs2, is equal to Abs1 except for unit base (group of same letters of length 2).

\( \alpha \) is obtained by adding to \( \alpha' \) (letter = 'A') \( \rightarrow \) (letter = 'I')

And \( \beta I \) is "Replace the rightmost letter by its successor".

We then get using an extended version of the encoding scheme described above:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>L(Abs1)</th>
<th>L(( \beta I )Abs1)</th>
<th>L(( \alpha' ))</th>
<th>L(( \alpha )( \alpha' ))</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>= -log(1/2) - log(1/2) + 4 + 2 = 8 bits</td>
<td>= log(1/3) = 1.58</td>
<td>= log(26/26^2) = 4.70</td>
<td>= log(1/52) = 5.70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

So that the overall complexity of this analogy is: 20 bits.

4.4. Experimental results

In the work partially reported here, we examined three questions. First, does the 'analogy = economical perception' perspective seem to have some validity? Second, what exactly is transferred in an analogy? And last, what is the optimal level of abstraction, in the context of an analogy, for the intermediary concepts Abs1 and Abs2?

To this aim, we have set to manually translate miscellaneous analogy problems in the letter microworld with various competing solutions, and then to compute their corresponding complexity. We compared then the results obtained both with intuitive ratings of the diverse analogies and with attached frequency results measured with a set of subject and reported in [Mitchell,93] (multiple answers were possible). We made also a comparison with COPYCAT's behavior so as to test if the fact that we share with this system a lot of the same representation primitives induces a bias towards similar results. The expectation if our model is correct is that less complex analogies should correspond to the preferred ones. At the same time, we inspected the abstractions used in the best analogies with regard to the second and third questions above. For lack of space, only sketchy details of some experiments are given thereunder, more can be found in [Cornuèjols,94].

Problem 1:  
\( abc \Rightarrow abd \);  
\( ii jj k k \Rightarrow ? \)

Solution 1: "Replace rightmost group of letters by its successor"  
\( ii jj k k \Rightarrow ii jj ll \)

Solution 2: "Replace rightmost letter by its successor"  
\( ii jj k k \Rightarrow ii jj kl \)

Solution 3: "Replace rightmost letter by D"  
\( ii jj k k \Rightarrow ii jj kd \)

Solution 4: "Replace third letter by its successor"  
\( ii jj k k \Rightarrow ii jj k k \)

Solution 5: "Replace Cs by Ds"  
\( ii jj k k \Rightarrow ii jj k k \)

Problem 2:  
\( abc \Rightarrow abd \);  
\( srqp \Rightarrow ? \)

Solution 1: "Replace rightmost letter by its predecessor"  
\( srqp \Rightarrow srqo \)

Solution 2: "Replace leftmost letter by its successor"  
\( srqp \Rightarrow trqp \)

Problem 3:  
\( abc \Rightarrow abd \);  
\( x cg \Rightarrow ? \)

Solution 1: "Replace rightmost letter by its successor"  
\( x cg \Rightarrow x ch \)

Solution 2: "Replace Cs by Ds"  
\( x cg \Rightarrow x dq \)

Solution 3: "Replace rightmost letter by D"  
\( x cg \Rightarrow x cd \)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Complexity</th>
<th>P1:S1</th>
<th>P1:S2</th>
<th>P1:S3</th>
<th>P1:S4</th>
<th>P1:S5</th>
<th>P2:S1</th>
<th>P2:S2</th>
<th>P3:S1</th>
<th>P3:S2</th>
<th>P3:S3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20 bits</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>24.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hum.</td>
<td>1/26</td>
<td>26/26</td>
<td>2/26</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>10/34</td>
<td>7/34</td>
<td>43/49</td>
<td>6/49</td>
<td>4/49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>subjects</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COPYCAT</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>16.5%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>18.6%</td>
<td>97.4%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intuitive rating</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The figures for the complexity measure were obtained using formula (1) of section 4.3. and a fully developed version of the encoding scheme briefly presented in sections 4.1 and 4.2. Because this encoding scheme leaves place for arbitrariness in some places, the absolute values of the complexity numbers should be taken with a grain of salt. Their relative values however are more interesting. They can indeed be interpreted as relative probabilities of occurrence. Thus, \( \text{Prob}(P1:S2)/\text{Prob}(P1:S1) = 2^{22.3-20} = 2^{3.2} = 10.24 \). The observation of the overall table shows that if general trends of the complexity measure are in accord with experimental evidences with human subjects and COPYCAT, the comparison at this stage is yet not conclusive.

5. Conclusion

This paper has presented a new perspective where analogy is seen as the result of an economical perception of the analogues. A formal account for this was given implying a form of the Minimum Description Length Principle. Experimental tests on toys problems reveal: (i) that the encoding problem, particularly assigning description lengths to conceptual primitives, is difficult, and (ii) that nonetheless first results confirm that less complex analogies are also the preferred ones. In addition, the proposed model offers some bases for explaining the properties of analogy listed in section 1.3. Analogical thinking is pervasive because it is intrinsically an economical mode of thinking. Abstract analogies are preferred because they correspond to the most economical way of perceiving two things as similar. Good agreement in the ratings of analogies by different people would result from the sharing of the same optimal way of perceiving things. Analogy is non involutive and non idempotent because of the asymmetry between the source and the target as underlined in section 4.3. And finally, analogy making can be improved in our model by the learning of prior probabilities of the perceptual primitives, therefore altering their description length, and thence the overall relative complexities of the various possible analogies. On the other hand, this last property is also responsible for the sensitivity to the coding prescription that renders it a delicate task.

This research reveals the deep interdependencies that may exist between statistics and forms of inference like analogy that seem to imply only symbolic manipulations of the descriptions of single situations. If we consider indeed, as we did here, any inferencing as
the search for theories that provide economic encodings for the evidences, and if we recognize that an efficient coding scheme must reflect our prior expectations about the world, then it follows that inferencing will at the end rely on statistics. This is why symbolic reasoning and statistical analysis are two sides of the same coin that cannot be disjoined in Artificial Intelligence.

References:


